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Seneca’s Personification of the Passions 
 
Maior pars mortalium, Pauline, de naturae malignitate conqueritur, quod in exiguum aeui 
gignimur, quod haec tam uelociter, tam rapide dati nobis temporis spatia decurrunt, adeo ut 
exceptis admodum paucis ceteros in ipso uitae apparatu uita desituat… Omnia licet quae 
umquam ingenia fulserunt in hoc unum consentant numquam satis hanc humanarum mentium 
caliginem mirabuntur. 
The largest part of mortals, Paulinus, complain about the meanness of nature, because we are 
born into a little bit of time, because these courses of time surrendered for us run so swiftly, so 
rapidly, to such a degree that life leaves many in a lurch with very few exceptions in the 
preparation of life itself…Although all clever people who ever shone agree upon this one point, 
they never marvel enough at this darkness of human mind. 
(Seneca, De Brevitate Vitae, I.I; III.I) 
 
Although these two sentences are in separate passages of Seneca’s De Brevitate Vitae, they 
encompass a holistic argument of Seneca’s: people waste their lives because of their focus on 
passions, yet they continue to complain that life is too short. Before Seneca focuses on how to 
make the most of life in De Brevitate Vitae, he writes of the importance of both action and 
contemplation in De Otio. Several times he personifies passions, specifically anger in De Ira and 
Medea (Nussbaum 412, 454), and even life itself, as seen in De Brevitate Vitae I.I. By personifying 
life and time in De Brevitate Vitae making them the subjects of action verbs, Seneca emphasizes 
the power passions have over humans. This personification contributes to the loss of human agency 
passions produce. Therefore, Seneca advocates through his prose - grammar, syntax, and diction - 
that passions should be completely extirpated in order for humans to live a more controlled life. 
 Seneca begins De Brevitate Vitae explaining to Paulinus that many men complain life is 
too brief. Because humans, Seneca says, spend more of life preparing for something great or 
focusing on their external passions rather than simply living, life seems short: “the largest part of 
mortals, Paulinus, complain about the meanness of nature, because we are born into a little bit of 
time, because these courses of time surrendered for us run so swiftly, so rapidly, to such a degree 
that life leaves many in a lurch with very few exceptions in the preparation of life itself.”  
Smith 2 
By using decurrunt, he emphasizes the urgency humans feel to live well. Decurrunt is the 
active from of decurrere, meaning “to run.” In the same way, the use of destituat, which means 
“to leave in a lurch” implies that life itself chooses to run swiftly and leave humans confused by 
its absence. These two vocabulary choices personify time, implying that it actively runs around 
humans, rather than humans running through life purposefully. Therefore, life and time are both 
personified by Seneca, much like anger and grief in De Ira and Medea.  
Before time runs swiftly by us, we are gignimur, born into, only a little bit of it in the first 
place. The use of gignimur creates a sense of passivity in humans just as decurrunt makes life 
more active. Gignimur is the deponent form of gignere, which in this specific sentence translates 
as “we are born into...” We (humans) complain that we are born into a little bit of time, over 
which we have no control. Time passes us by without so much as a second glance. On the other 
hand, anger seeks us out, like a lion stalking its prey or a “gathering of wild beasts” (Nussbaum 
420). When examined together, time becomes the prey that we should be pursuing, while anger 
is the predator that stalks us until we succumb to its power. The use the active forms of verbs to 
describe the impact life, time, anger, and grief have on humans personifies them and gives them 
their own agency. In fact, these forces of love, anger, and grief are “stronger than any force of 
fire or swelling gale” (Nussbaum 454). According to Seneca, passions and emotions hold more 
power over us than any storm because the wriggle their way into our core so that “passions may 
operate beneath the level of consciousness” (Nussbaum 454-55). This, therefore, makes it 
difficult to extirpate them, but all the more necessary to do so. 
 The agency of individual emotions is reinforced by using the genitive possessive forms of 
temporis, time, and humanarum mentium, human mind. The possessive form of time, temporis, 
owns the course that runs through the life of humans. Seneca is implying that humans do not own 
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time, which means we cannot fully control it. Similarly, humanarum mentium caliginem means 
the human mind owns the darkness at which we do not marvel enough. The idea of ownership in 
these two passages represent that time and darkness are something outside of ourselves, external 
beings that are not ingrained within us. This is reinforced by Nussbaum when she says, “[t]hus 
aggression grows not inside our nature, but out of an interaction between nature and 
conditions…” (421). The condition of our life starts to shape us through its own devices, which 
further removes our agency. Here we begin to see why Seneca insists that we need completely 
remove all external influences of anger, greed, lust, grief, and similar attributes. It is anger 
specifically that he creates to be human, something that may begin in our souls but soon becomes 
something outside of ourselves, uncontrollable and vile. 
 Throughout her commentary on De Ira, Martha Nussbaum frequently discusses the 
power of the passions to overtake a person’s life. About Seneca’s thoughts regarding anger, she 
says, “in personifying anger, he invariably chooses images that portray it as in its very nature 
excessive and uncontrolled…”  (419).   Similarly, grief is personified in Medea: “[l]ight is the 
grief that can deliberate prudently and conceal itself: great sufferings do not hide…” (155-56). 
“Uncontrolled,” “deliberate,” and “conceal” each indicate actions that require intentional 
movements and motives. Saying anger and grief do these things removes human agency while 
creating human characteristics for anger and grief. No longer do we exert control over our own 
anger and grief, but these emotions choose our actions for us. De Brevitate Vitae conveys the 
same idea with life and time. Running is an animalistic verb, usually one associated with prey or 
urgency; it is an action verb, like conceal, that requires specific design to accomplish the task. 
Only humans or animals can perform tasks with an intentionality in a way described by these 
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verbs, which further contributes to the personification of life and time. As a result of this swift 
running of time, we are left in a lurch, staggering about like a drunkard without direction.  
 In our confusion, malignitate, meanness, and caliginem, darkness, have a better foothold 
to overtake our souls, as described in De Brevitate Vitae I and III. Life itself has a meanness that 
creates the darkness within the human mind. This meanness is a choice of the personified Life, 
and the natural human reaction to this terror in the night is a passionate one, screaming and 
fighting until the unseen enemy is brought down. However, Seneca argues we do not need 
passions to react to this humanarum mentium caliginem. Instead, we are to aim for humanitas - 
doing the morally virtuous deed solely for the betterment of humanity rather than any internal 
anger. To do so, we must separate ourselves from the situation and “remov[e] barriers that stand 
between oneself and one’s fellow citizens” (Nussbaum 429). Our passions are the barriers that 
elevate external circumstances far past the point they belong, as seen in Medea. Nussbaum 
writes, “Medea’s emotions – love, grief, anger – fundamentally involve the assignment of high 
value to external objects and situations” which exemplifies Seneca’s hatred of the external 
influences in our lives.  It is through the attention to these passions that life melts away, evident 
in De Brevitate Vitae I.IV when Seneca says, “ubi nulli bonae rei impenditur.”  For no good 
thing, life is expended; we waste it on passions that steal our agency.  
 To ensure humans do not drown in our passions, Seneca insists human discipline reclaims 
our life that otherwise falls by the wayside. Our drowning begins when we actually allow our 
agency to be lost in the first place, supported by Seneca writing, “non accipimus breuem uitam 
sed facimus” – we do not receive a short life, but we make it so (I.IV).  Both verbs in this 
sentence (accipimus and facimus) are present active indicative forms. The subject is we, the 
humans, that choose to make our life short. By using the active form of the verbs in this 
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sentence, shortly after he utilized the passive form to describe humans, Seneca creates a 
juxtaposition regarding our agency. At first, we choose how to spend our life. The more we 
allow passions into our life, the less agency we have – the turbulent seas begin to overtake us. 
Such is seen with Medea, who loved Jason properly, yet this love bore anger and grief. 
Furthermore, the one guy who holds insatiable greed or pays painstaking attention to superfluous 
labors is tormented by his passions (De Brevitate Vitae, II.II). Shortly after this passage, Seneca 
lists numerous external things that snatch a person’s time, everything from a mistress to a dutiful 
running around for the city (De Brevitate Vitae, III.II). External passions, therefore, become a 
disease and a thief of our time making the decision, much as a human would, to remove 
themselves from our grasp, which purposefully creates chaos in a person’s mind. 
The rescue from the seas fraught with the dangers of passion, argues Seneca, is 
detachment. In Medea, “Seneca forces us to see that it is the one who loves properly, loyally, the 
one who really understands what it is to value a commitment to an external object, is who will be 
most derailed by a loss...and driven mad by grief and anger” (Nussbaum 446). To not feel this 
anger, we must realize the darkness of the human mind then remove ourselves from it. Our mind 
is deceitful, owning a darkness outside itself that it cannot control.  The darkness purposefully 
chooses to be darkness. Because of this, Seneca continually argues for more discipline in life: 
“by discipline it thrives, so our lifespan greatly increases for the one mapping it out well” (De 
Brevitate Vitae, II.IV). “Mapping it out well” requires complete extirpation of passion because 
we cannot stop passion from excess once it begins, like the tide rising on an oblivious 
beachcomber. The Chorus in Medea supports this, singing, “excessive passions, when they 
come, bring neither good fame nor virtue to men” (627-31). Only disaster and a short life await 
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those who indulge in external passions, according to Seneca, because the passions themselves 
have as much agency as the human attempting to control them. 
The applicability of these ideas is questionable; however, the modus operandi by which 
Seneca tries to explain his argument is effective. By first personifying life itself through active 
verbs and possessive genitives, Seneca shows that external circumstances remove human agency. 
His suggestion to fix this disease is to detach ourselves from anger and love because these 
passions become the unrestrained sea that wreaks havoc on our lives. Only by avoiding the water 
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